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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KAREN LILLIAN LAYTON and
KATHY LAYTON by and through
her guardian ad litem KAREN
LILLIAN LAYTON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
CO
ANY, a corporation, and
DENVER & RIO GRANDE
'VESTERN RAILROAD
CO:MPANY, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
12512

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT,
Union Pacific Railroad Company
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent accepts as sufficient the STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE, the DISPOSISITION IN THE LOWER COURT and the RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL as set forth in appellants' brief, but the STATEMENT OF FACTS con-
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tained therein is not detailed enough to provide the court
with a full and complete explanation of the facts of this
lawsuit and respondent therefore supplements said
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. HISTORY OF THIS LITIGATION
Appellants' decedent, Kenneth Layton, was killed
on January 15, 1965, at the public stockyards in North
Salt Lake, Utah. At the time of his death decedent was
working in course of his employment with the Salt Lake
Stockyards Operating Company and was assisting in unloading hogs from railroad cars into feeding pens of the
stockyards after said cars had been spotted at the stockyards docks (R. 195, 226-229; Exhibit 4-P). As a result
of his death appellants were paid the compensation provided by the 'Vorkm en's Compensation Act of the State
of Utah by decedent's employer's carrier, the State Insurance Fund ( R. 133) .
On N ovem her 17, 1966, appellant filed an original
complaint and on January 16, 1967, an amended complaint against Union Pacific Railroad Company (hereinafter Union Pacific) alleging that it was negligent,
causing the death of appellants' decedent in respect to
enumerated items involving construction and maintenance of the track and roadbed upon which the railroad
cars were being operated, including the construction of
the track as it related to the construction of side struc-
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tures consisting of the docks owned by the stockyards
company (R. 4-6, 14-16).
Union Pacific answered appellants' amended complaint on January 23, 1967, and in that answer included
an allegation that the Denver and Rio Grande \Vestern
Railroad Company (hereinafter Rio Grande) was entirely responsible for the maintenance of the trackage
and roadbed involved though at the joint and equal expense of Union Pacific and Rio Grande ( R. 17). Appellants thereupon sought leave to further amend and
did further amend their complaint to include Rio Grande
as a party. In that amended complaint, appellants alleged that both railroad defendants were negligent in the
construction and maintenance of and operation over, the
track and roadbed including its relation to side structures.
The lower court upon motion of the Rio Grande
dismissed it from the lawsuit and appellants perfected
an appeal from that dismissal which resulted in the decision of this Court dated October 15, 1968, Layton v.
UPRR, 21 Utah 2d 374, 445 P. 2d 988, wherein this
Court decided that Rio Grande was not negligent in the
particulars alleged under the admitted facts of the case.
The Court said:
"The facts of this care are not in dispute. The
decedent worked for the Salt Lake Union Stock
Yards, and at the time he lost his life he was unloading a carload of hogs consigned to his employer. The two defendant railroa.d companies
had a joint lease on the land upon which the tracks
were placed, and the D. & R. G. ,V. pursuant to
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agreement with the Union Pacific !Jlaintained the
trackage but billed the lJ nion Pa)'rc for one-half
of the costs thereof. The car in question and the
engine moving it belonged to the Union Pacific,
and the D. & R. G. ,V. is not charged with any
negligence in the train movement.
"While unloading the hogs, the deceased worked on the dock, which was the property of and in
the exclusive possession of his employer. During
the unloading operation it is claimed that wet
straw fell from the car being unloaded onto the
ground underneath and created a slick and slippery condition over and about the tracks.
"The only claims of negligence against the
D. & R. G. W. are in substance that (a) it negligently allowed slippery and icy straw to accumulate and be upon the roadbed and tracks; (b) it
failed to remove the straw after it knew or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known
of its presence; ( c) it failed to warn the deceased
of the slippery and icy straw; and ( d) the roadbed was not properly constructed with reference
to side structures.
"It is to be noted that the train was not derailed and that the track was sufficiently maintained so as to permit train traffic thereon without any difficulty. The deceased had no duties
which required him to descend to the ground from
the dock where his work required him to be. In
fact, he slipped and fell from the dock onto the
ground, where he was crushed by the trucks of
the moving car. The plaintiffs say that he was
prevented from escaping the movement of the
train by reason of the excess quantity of slick
straw upon the ground.

* * *
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"The duty to maintain trackage in this case
does not require a constant removal of straw
which falls from a railroad car while livestock is
being unloaded. In fact, it is difficult to see how
the D. & R. G. ,i\T. could constantly keep the
ground free from falling straw without interfering with the unloading operation by the deceased and his fellow employees. It is equally difficult to see how the D. & R. G. W. could foresee
that the deceased would slip and fall from the
dock and thus be upon the ground at all, since his
work was confined to the dock area. The D. & R.
G. ,i\T. thus owed him no duty to keep the tracks
free from straw and ice and had no reasonable
time or opportunity to do so.
"\Ve therefore hold under the admitted facts
of this case that the plaintiffs cannot state a valid
claim against the D. & R. G. W." (R. 95)
Following the action taken by this Honorable Court
and upon remand to the District Court, appellants sought
and obtained leave to again amend their complaint to allege additional grounds of negligence against Union Pacific. In addition to making against Union Pacific the
identical allegations of negligence theretofore made
against both defendants in respect to the construction
and maintenance of the track, roadbed, and side structures (which had been disposed of contrary to appellants' contentions in respect to Rio Grande) appellants
added allegations of negligence in respect to the operation of the switch movement being performed by Union
Pacific at the time and place of the accident (R. 118121).
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After receipt of appellants' third amended complaint, Union Pacific filed a motion for partial summary
judgment in its favor on the allegations of negligence in
respect to construction and maintenance of the track,
roadbed, and side structures, basing said motion on the
opinion of this Honorable Court wherein it determined
that Rio Grande owed no duty toward appellants' decedent in respect to the track, roadbed, and side structures, which had been breached resulting in his death.
Union Pacific argued that it had no greater duty, and
even less duty to decedent in respect to construction and
maintenance of the track, roadbed, and side structures
than had Rio Grande. At the hearing on this motion, the
court granted Union Pacific's motion for partial summary judgment and entered the same (R. 131, 135-141).
Appellants then petitioned this Honorable Court for an
interlocutory appeal from said entry of partial summary
judgment and that petition was denied. (Case No. 11714
in this Court. )
Following further discovery, the issues in respect to
appellants' claims of negligence relating to the operation
of the switching movement by Union Pacific were fully
tried to the court sitting without a jury and the court
found following such trial that appellants had failed to
sustain their burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that Union Pacific was negligent and granted final judgment to Union Pacific (R. 176-177, 180).
Appellants thereupon prosecuted this appeal requesting
a new trial as to all issues.
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B. THE FACTS OF THE ACCIDENT
On the night of the accident, Union Pacific was
switching 31 carloads of hogs into the plant of the Salt
Lake Union Stockyards for unloading (Exhibit 37-D).
The night was cold and slightly foggy, but clear enough
to see well ( R. 290, 298). There was adequate artificial
light insofar as the unloading at the docks was concerned,
although the light did not reach well underneath the railroad cars (R. 257, 419). There was some straw and
manure on the dock which was somewhat frosty in view
of the nature of the night (R. 290-291), but there was
no snow on the dock in the working area since it had been
shoveled off down onto the track and roadbed by the
dock workers at the commencement of their shift (R.
290, 418). The carloads of hogs were being unloaded by
stockyard employees at stockyard docks identified as 1,
2, and 3 on Exhibit 16-P (R. 228-229). Union Pacific's
engine was on the south end of the switching movement
and the cars were being moved northward by the engine
for unloading beginning with the northernmost cars,
three cars at a time (R. 262, 334, 341).
There was a full train crew consisting of engineer
Kenneth Hier, fireman Harley Workman, engine foreman Joseph Terry, pin puller S. Jack Spratt, and field
man C. Fred Hansen, all employees of Union Pacific
(R. 261). This was an experienced crew. Hier had 29
years experience as an engineer ( R. 260) with 11 years
on this stockyards job (R. 271). Spratt had been on the
stockyards job approximately a year (R. 282). Hansen
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had 25 years of experience (R. 346). Terry had 31 years
experience ( R. 404) and six or seven on the stockyards
job (R. 405). The fireman and the engineer were in the
cab of the switch engine ( R. 273) and the pin puller was
stationed on top of a caboose ( R. 264) next to the engine
in order to relay signals to the engineer from the other
men in the crew, particularly field man Hansen who was
spotting the cars ( R. 280) .
In order to unload the hogs, one car would be
spotted at each of the docks marked 1, 2, and 3 on Exhibit 16-P with the car door corresponding to one of the
openings in the dock chutes of each of said docks ( R.
227 -229) . The car door would then be opened and the
wing gates on the dock would be placed inside the car
door, a dock board inserted, the hogs would be chased
out of the railroad car and into the dock chute by two
stockyard employees working at each dock and the hogs
would then be driven down the chutes by the dock workers and other stockyards employees to feeding pens (R.
253-254, 288, 467) . As soon as all the hogs had been unloaded from the car, the wing gates on the dock would
be placed back into position, the dock boards would be
removed from the cars, and Hansen, the field man of the
Union Pacific crew, would be told that the dock workers
were ready for the cars to be moved to the next spot (R.
230-231, 253-254).
Hansen was directing the switching movement from
the running boards in the center of the tops of the railroad cars and was stationed on top of the car spotted at
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the dock numbered 2 in the picture identified as Exhibit
16-P which was also the dock at which the decedent was
working along with co-workers and stockyard employees,
Ray Payne and Clayton Dennis (R. 334, 466). Before
beginning any movement of the cars, Hansen would step
over to the side of the car from the running board and see
that all of the dock workers were clear of the cars and
that the movement to the next spot was ready to begin.
He would also transmit a warning that the movement
was about to begin and would receive an assurance from
each dock that everyone was clear. He would then signal
the movement to begin and as the movement began, he
would step back up on the running board and walk south
as the cars were moving north, walking at about the
same speed the cars were moving, thereby remaining in
the same relative position in respect to dock No. 2 in
order that he could correctly spot the next set of three
cars at the respective docks ( R. 334-337, 341-342) . After
Hansen had stepped away from the edge of the car and
back to the center running board, he was unable to see
the stockyards employees in the dock area immediately
adjacent to the cars, but could see other stockyards employees farther away from the cars (R. 335).
The track upon which the switching was done was
fairly level in the vicinity of the docks, but further to the
north and west the grade of the track was away from the
docks and consequently during the entire movement,
hand brakes were set on several of the lead cars in order
that the cars could be kept bunched together and the
spots made accurately (R. 270-271). The evening of the
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accident 27 cars had been unloaded in the normal manner
and 4 cars still remained to be spotted for unloading (R.
467; Exhibit 37-D). At that time, since field man Hansen was within sight distance of pin puller Spratt and
could see his lantern clearly ( R. 342) , engine foreman
Terry, who initially had been in position between Hansen and Spratt to relay signals (R. 341) had gone into
the administration building at the stockyards to take care
of the paper work involved in delivering the hogs to the
stockyards (R. 338, 406, 407).
On the movement in which decedent lost his life,
Hansen had ascertained that the docks were cleared, had
received assurance from the docks that they were clear,
had signaled for the movement to start and had stepped
to the running board and was walking south on top of
the cars as they were moving north when from over his
left shoulder he heard Payne cry out to stop the train
(R. 336-337, 345). Hansen immediately gave a washout signal to stop the movement and it did stop within a
very few feet thereafter, in his opinion 8-10 feet (R.
345) . This stop signal given by Hansen had to be and
was relayed by Spratt (R. 280), and was acted on immediately thereafter by engineer Hier after he received
Spratt's signal (R. 266).
At the time said movement started, decedent was
standing by the dock at which he was working, well away
from the moving cars, talking to Payne and Dennis, both
co-workers at the stockyards (R. 304-305, 467-468). No
evidence was introduced to explain why decedent left
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that place of safety and placed himself in a position
where he fell off the dock under the moving railroad
cars, but the evidence is clear that decedent had no duties
to perform near the railroad cars while they were moving ( R. 254-255) .
In any event, Payne, Dennis, and decedent were
standing talking while the railroad cars were moving and
then all took a couple of steps to the east away from the
moving cars ( R. 304). A short time thereafter Payne
heard decedent say in a normal tone of voice, "Help me,
Ray, I've slipped." Payne turned, went to the edge of
the dock, looked down and saw decedent under the train
and at that time decedent said, "Can you help me get out
of here?" or something to that effect. Payne then heard
decedent's bones breaking, decedent stopped talking, and
Payne screamed for the train to stop ( R. 298). When
the movement stopped shortly thereafter, decedent was
pinned beneath the truck side of a railroad car identified
as Great Northern 58498 (R. 446; Exhibit 29-P) and
his body was approximately in front of the main double
chute of dock No. 2 (Exhibits 27-P through 31-P). One
other witness, a car inspector for Union Pacific, Walter
C. Griffin, claimed to have seen decedent fall. Griffin
was on duty for Union Pacific at the stockyards but was
not a member of the train crew and would not ordinarily
give signals to the train crew nor be involved in the switch
movement ( R. 373-page 190 of transcript) . Griffin
was leaning against the north post of dock No. 2 (Exhibit 16-P) waiting to close doors on the unloaded cars
after the hogs were unloaded (R. 372-369-pages 184-
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186 of transcript). Griffin stated that decedent fell from
a place about midway between dock No. 2 and the dock
to the south thereof ( R. 37 4; Exhibit 23-P). He immediately began to yell and wave his lantern, and he stated
the train stopped within approximately 10 feet after decedent fell. He also stated the cars had moved approximately 11/2 car lengths between the time they started
moving and the time decedent fell (R. 381).
Decedent's death was apparently instantaneous as
soon as the first bone snapped for he stopped talking and
from the multiple fractures and crushing injuries found
by the medical examiner, it appears probable that decedent's neck was snapped and that he was thereafter
rolled under the truck side of the car, which apparently
crushed the entire right side of his body (R. 298; Exhibit 3-P, 27-P through 31-P).
The fore going facts in respondent's opinion will
provide the court with sufficient facts to properly review
the issues of this appeal, but respondent deems it necessary also to reply to certain factual statements made in
the argument in appellants' brief.
Appellants argue facts by disclosing only an incomplete part of those facts to the court. For example, on
pages 4 and 5 they argue that Union Pacific could foresee that stockyards employees might occasionally be on
the ground near the tracks in order to catch a hog that
had escaped during the unloading process, but appellants
fail to point out to the court that when this occurred
(once a week or once every two weeks) the train crew
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was fully informed that stockyards employees were going down to the ground from the dock and that the train
crew understood the railroad cars were not to be moved
until the hog was caught and the stockyards employees
had remounted the docks (R. 291-292). There was absolutely no evidence that Union Pacific could reasonably
foresee that any stockyards employee would be on the
ground between the track and the dock while railroad
cars were being moved.
Appellants' brief also includes asserted facts which
are not in accordance with the testimony. On page 9 they
say that, "Hansen walked from 11/2 to 21/2 car lengths
after the decedent fell." This is clearly not shown by the
facts as testified to by all witnesses and set forth above,
for it is apparent therefrom that the movement was
stopped in less distance than 11;2 car lengths after decedent fell since one and one-half car lengths had gone by
before he fell (R. 381) and the cars were not yet to the
unloading spot when the movement had stopped (R.
446-447, 467; Exhibits 27-P through 31-P).
Likewise on page 10 of appellants' brief they state
that, "The function of the foreman was to pass signals
when the switchman couldn't see" but neglect to add that
this duty exists only when the field man and pin puller
can't see each other's signals and that both of those men
were within sight of each other's signals at the time and
place of the accident ( R. 342, 362) .
The safety and operating rules numbered 4065, 106,
828, and 802 set forth and argued on pages 11 and 12 of
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appellants' brief are clearly not applicable to Union Pacific's switch movement at the time and place of this accident and appellants introduced no testimony to show that
they were. The only testimony in respect to rules is that
no rule violations occurred (R. 362).
Appellants' statement on page 10 of their brief that
"the train crew relaxed" is simply a figment of appellants' imagination since there was no evidence of any
relaxation on the part of any of the crew members and
there would be no reason to relax since it is just as hard
to correctly spot the last four cars in a movement as it is
the first twenty-seven. A fair reading of the testimony
of each of the crew members discloses that each was engaged in the diligent performance of his duties at the
time of the accident.
Respondent also feels compelled to comment generally upon appellants' argument wherein appellants consistently argue facts and inferences therefrom concerning the operation of Union Pacific's switch movement in
the light most favorable to them as though the trial court
had determined those facts in their favor when the exact
opposite is true.
STATEl\fENT OF POINTS
POINT I
JUDGE ELTON CORRECTLY ENTERED
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF UNION PACIFIC ON THE ALLEGA-
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TIONS OF NEGLIGENCE
BOTH DEFENDANTS.

AGAINST

POINT II
JUDGE WILKINS DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS HAD FAILED 'l'O
PROVE UNION PACIFIC NEGLIGENT IN
RESPECT TO THE OPERATION OF ITS
SWITCHING MOVEMENT.
POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
JUDGE ELTON CORRECTLY ENTERED
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF UNION PACIFIC ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF NEGLIGENCE !iADE AGAINST
BOTH DEFENDANTS.
When this Honorable Court determined that Rio
Grande had no duty in respect to decedent arising out of
the construction and maintenance of the track and roadbed nor in respect to its construction and maintenance as
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it related to side structures, it necessarily must follow
that there is a similar lack of such duty on the part of
Union Pacific toward decedent. The allegations of negligence made by appellants against Union Pacific in those
respects were identical to those made by appellants
against Rio Grande and arose from precisely the same
factual situation. If this Court will substitute the words
"Union Pacific" for the words "D. & R. G. W." wherever the same appear in this Court's earlier decision in
this case, supra, beginning with the recitals of what elements are necessary for plaintiff to prove in order to recover, starting with the paragraph numbered I at the
bottom of page 376 of 21 Utah 2d, this Court will readily
observe that the allegations of appellants' complaint
which were the subject matter of the summary judgment
had already been determined in this action adversely to
appellants' contentions prior to Judge Elton's entry of
summary judgment thereon. Although it may not be
precisely correct to say that the earlier decision of this
Court has become the law of the case in respect to Union
Pacific (since different railroads are involved), nevertheless, the reason for establishing the rule of the law of
the case applies with equal force to the partial summary
judgment entered in favor of Union Pacific. The rule is
that where the questions of law and fact are the same, the
decision of the first appeal, whether right or wrong, becomes the law of the case on the second appeal and is
binding as well on the parties to the action, the trial court,
and the appellate court, Helper State Bank vs. Grus, 95
Utah 320, 81 P. 2d 359. See also the cases cited therein
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and Gammon vs. Federated Muk Producers Association
'
Inc., 14 Utah 2d 291, 383 P. 2d 402.
The only factual difference between Rio Grande
and Union Pacific in respect to the track and roadbed
(aside from the fact that as between the two it was Rio
Grande' s duty to construct and maintain the same) was
the fact that at the time of the accident Union Pacific
was operating a switching movement on the track. Over
Union Pacific's objection, Judge Wilkins at the trial
allowed the introduction of evidence by which appellants
attempted to prove that the condition of the track and
roadbed was such that Union Pacific was negligent in
operating over the same at the time and place of the accident and this contention of appellants was fully explored
at the trial (R. 205, 209-210, 215-216, 243, 250-252, 255256, 290-292, 364, 370-372, 417-418; Exhibits 17-P
through 24-P, 27-P through 31-P). This contention
therefore was one of the contentions decided adversely
to appellants by Judge Wilkins (R. 472).
Judge \Vilkins undoubtedly would also have allowed appellants' counsel to introduce evidence in respect to the construction of the dock inside the clearance
limits imposed by order of the Public Service Commission of Utah if appellants' counsel had not stipulated to
the truth of the fact that the track, roadbed, and side
structures at the scene of the accident all had been constructed prior to the promulgation of said order of the
Public Service Commission and were in existence at the
time of the order, and that said order was applicable only
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to new construction done after the promulgation of said
order ( R. 436-442) .
Appellants also contend in connection with the grant
of partial summary judgment that Judge Elton failed
to comply with Rule 56(d) U.R.C.P., which rule requires the Court to specify the noncontroverted facts and
those controverted when a partial summary judgment is
granted. This contention is not justified for it is clear
from the judgment itself (R. 138-139) that the judgment entered by Judge Elton was based on the admitted
facts of the case as set forth in the decision of this Honorable Court as those facts applied to allegations of negligence made against e nion Pacific identical to those
allegations theretofore decided adversely to appellants
in respect to Rio Grande. It is also clear from the record
that appellants were not in any way restricted from fully
adjudicating at the trial before Judge Wilkins all of the
facts and contentions surrounding the operation of Union
Pacific's switching movement at the time and place of
the accident, including the condition of the track and
roadbed at that time and place.

POINT II
JUDGE WILKINS DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS HAD FAILED TO
PROVE UNION PACIFIC NEGLIGENT IN
RESPECT TO THE OPERATION OF ITS
SWITCHING MOVEMENT.
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Respondent finds it difficult to believe that appellants can seriously assert as they apparently do on page
7 of their brief that, "The evidence presented does not
support a finding that the defendant, Union Pacific
Railroad Company, was free from negligence." In order
to make that assertion appellants must be considering
every fact and every inference therefrom most favorab1y to them, although the case was decided by the lower
court adversely to them. This is not the proper approach
to those facts on this appeal as this Court has so succinctly stated in Thompson vs. Van W agenen, 25 Utah 2d
383, 483 P. 2d 427, as follows:
"There no doubt would be merit to the defendant's (appellants' in this case) argument if we
could properly do as he has done in his brief: select those aspects of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom which are favorable
to his contentions. However, as we are constantly
reiterating, difficult as it seems to be for a losing
party to see the other point of view, the law has
long been established to the contrary: that we survey the evidence and whatever reasonable inferences may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light
favorable to the findings and judgment."
Under the evidence of this case, the Court's finding
that appellants had failed to prove Union Pacific negligent in the operation of its switching movement can
clearly be sustained on the grounds that the movement
was being performed in a normal and customary manner
consistent with reasonable care, that adequate warning
was given prior to beginning the movement and that

19

everything possible was done to avert the tragedy after
decedent had fall en under the moving cars.
Appellants misconstrue the duty of Union Pacific
in respect to decedent on page 11 of their brief when they
state that Union Pacific owed a duty to decedent to
maintain a safe place for him to work. Decedent was not
in the employ of Union Pacific and the duty to maintain
a safe place to work arises solely out of the employment
relationship ( 53 Am. J ur. 2d, Master & Servant § 195).
The duty of Union Pacific towards a nonemployee working near the tracks on the property of a consignee and
employed by the consignee instead is covered by common
law principles of negligence and contributory negligence,
Raymond vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 113
Utah 26, 191 P. 2d 137.
Appellants also contend on page 11 of their brief
that Union Pacific failed to warn decedent of hazards
which might exist, and in respect to that allegation it
seems sufficient to say that Judge Wilkins could reasonably find from the evidence that all hazards in moving
railroad cars next to a dock on which decedent was working were as readily apparent to decedent as they were to
Union Pacific and that Union Pacific had fulfilled any
duty to warn that might exist by giving warning to decedent that the movement of the railroad cars was about
to begin. In addition, from the evidence it is clear the
railroad cars began moving when decedent was standing
in a place of safety and that any failure to warn concerning the beginning of the movement could not have been
a proximate cause of this unfortunate accident.
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On page 7 of appellants' brief, they state, "The ref us al of the court to accept the investigating officer's report in evidence was error." Respondent believes that
this casual reference to claimed error in appellants' brief
is not sufficient to preserve this point for consideration
of this Honorable Court on appeal, but assuming that
the point is here for consideration, it is clear that the trial
court's ruling at pages 326 and 327 of the record is correct. The investigating officer's report (proposed Exhibit 26-P) contained hearsay statements of individuals
who were available and who testified at the trial and it
also contained conclusions and opinions of the officer in
respect to his investigation when the officer was not
qualified as an expert in the investigation of this type of
accident ( R. 202) .
POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE.
In order for the doctrine of last clear chance to be
applicable, the court must first find that both decedent
and defendant were negligent in proximately causing the
accident. In this case the court found that neither party
had sustained their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the other party to be negligent.
Clearly, then, last clear chance has no application to this
case. Assuming, however, that the court had found negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory neg-
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ligence on the part of decedent, last clear chance would
still not apply to the facts of this accident for Union Pacific reasonably performed every action consistent with
its then existing ability to avoid decedent's injury once
decedent fell from the dock. The cases cited on pages 12,
13, and 14 of appellants' brief are cases in which the
factual situations are so clearly different from the factual situation in the instant case that although they may
correctly state the law, such is not applicable to the facts
of this accident. As this court has said many times, in
order that last clear chance may be applied the opportunity to avoid the accident must be a clear chance and
must not be only a possible chance. Holm,qren vs. Union
Pacific Railroad Company, 114 Utah 262, 198 P. 2d
459; Compton vs. O,qden Union Railway & Depot Company, 120 Utah 453, 235 P. 2d 515. And see Anderson
vs.
Garfield Ry. Company, 117 Utah 197,
214 P. 2d 607, wherein this Court stated on page 212 of
the Utah Reports and on page 614 of the Pacific Reporter that, "Equality in treatment to plaintiffs and defendants demands that the doctrine of last clear chance
be not invoked unless there is evidence that with the
means at hand the defendant clearly could have avoided
injury to the plaintiff." There is in Utah law no anticipatory last clear chance and Judge "\Vilkins correctly
held last clear chance inapplicable in this case.
CONCLUSION
The facts and circumstances surrounding the accident involving the death of appellants' husband and
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father demonstrate that the trial court was clearly correct in finding that Union Pacific was not negligent in
respect to this accident. Any hazard involved in this accident which may have contributed to decedent's death was
not a hazard created by Union Pacific's negligence, but
was rather a hazard of decedent's employment; and, fortunately, the Utah State Legislature has seen fit to enact
a law which provides compensation when persons are
killed or injured as a result of employment hazards. Appellants were paid the compensation provided by law for
relief of the hazards of decedent's employment and there
is simply no justification for appellants' apparent assumption that because Union Pacific was moving the
car under which decedent was killed, Union Pacific must
therefore have been negligent. The trial court has determined this case on the evidence in favor of Union Pacific
and that judgment should stand. To paraphrase what
this court has recently said in the case of Thompson vs.
Van W agenen, supra, appellants have had what they are
entitled to: a resort to a court with a full and fair opportunity to present their evidence and their contentions relating to the issues in controversy and have had them resolved by the court making findings and rendering judgment thereon. Referring generally to appellants' several
attacks on such judgment, the court should observe as it
did in the Thompson case:
"'Vhen the processes of justice have taken their
course in the trial court, culminating in findings
and a judgment, it is essential that they have some
solidai·ity. Serving that objective are the well
known rules of review which give them the pre-

23

sumption of verity and correctness. 'l'he reasons
usually assigned are the advantaged position and
the prerogatives of the trial court. .Further, and
in harmony therewith, it is plain to be seen that to
the extent judgments can easily be upset, the
processes of justice are weakened, and confidence
in the courts who render them is undermined.
Conversely, the degree of respect given to j udgments bears a direct relationship to the quality of
the processes of justice and to the confidence reposed in the courts. This is not meant to gainsay
nor to disparage the right nor the propriety of
appeal and review to correct errors of substance.
But it is in accord with what we think is the correct policy: that minor irregularities or errors
should be disregarded, and that the action of the
trial court should not be upset as to findings of
fact so long as they have reasonable and substantial support in the eYidence; nor as to the law, unless the trial court acted under some substantial
mistake or misunderstanding of the law which
may have materially affected the result."
After nearly six years of litigation this case should
finally be closed with aff irmance of the judgment of the
trial court.
Respectfully submitted,

A. U. MINER
N. ,V. KETTNER
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
Union Pacific Railroad Company
10 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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